

Redundancy or Reforms: Review of Pakistan's 2024–25 Agency Proliferation

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“Nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program.” – Milton Friedman

*“No government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. Government programs, once launched, never disappear. Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll ever see on this earth!”
– Ronald Reagan*

INTRODUCTION

In the FY 2024–25, Pakistan's federal and provincial governments once again introduced a long list of new agencies, authorities, and administrative units. These new bodies, launched under banners like modernization, reform, or better service delivery, cover everything from intelligence and cybersecurity to housing, education, and digital governance.^{1,2} On paper, this may look like progress. But when we look more closely, it becomes clear that much of this expansion follows a familiar pattern: instead of improving existing institutions, the government keeps creating new ones, often with overlapping roles and unclear responsibilities.³

This kind of growth doesn't necessarily mean better governance; the government already has far too many agencies doing similar work.⁴ Moreover, the government's footprint on the economy encompasses more than 67%, not merely through public enterprises but through a sprawling and duplicative administrative apparatus.⁵ Rather than fixing what's broken, there's a tendency to add more layers, more departments, more directorates, more “units”.^{6,7} This doesn't just waste public money; it also causes confusion, slows down decision-making, and opens the door for bureaucratic red tape and internal power struggles.⁸ At a time when Pakistan needs leaner, more efficient governance, expanding the state without fixing its inner workings risks doing more harm than good.

Federal Government, FY 2024–25

In FY 2024-25, The Government of Pakistan introduced a fresh wave of federal agencies, authorities, and regulatory commissions, ranging from the National Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre (NIFTAC) and National Forensic and Cyber Crime Agency (NFCA) to the Cannabis Control and Regulatory Authority (CCRA) and National Digital Commission (NDC). These additions often promoted under the guise of modernization, digital transformation, or regulatory streamlining reflect a recurring institutional pathology: state expansion by multiplication, not consolidation.

This expansion, rather than improving institutional coordination or enhancing national security, frequently deepens fragmentation, fosters institutional turf wars, and introduces new avenues for bureaucratic rent-seeking. Consider the creation of NIFTAC and its provincial arms (PIFTACs), which now operate alongside National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), Intelligence Bureau (IB), and other law enforcement entities. Rather than integrating intelligence and clarifying mandates, these new centers risk further institutional balkanization of the national security architecture, a problem well-documented in past failures to avert coordinated threats

despite the existence of numerous intelligence bodies.⁹ No amount of structural layering can substitute for interoperability, data sharing, and political neutrality, which remain weak or absent.

Similarly, NFCA and NCCIA, both under the Interior Ministry, now split digital forensics and cybercrime investigation into separate tracks. But what distinguishes “forensic examination” from “cybercrime prosecution”? These roles were previously (albeit imperfectly) handled by the FIA’s Cybercrime Wing. Instead of fixing its deficiencies, the government has simply duplicated functions with rebranded institutions, a classic case of governance by renaming rather than reforming.

The launch of sectoral regulatory authorities like the CCRA and the National Agri-trade and Food Safety Authority (NAFSA) further illustrates the objectification of control in already overregulated markets. In principle, medical cannabis regulation and food safety are modern public health imperatives. But in practice, the very sectors they aim to regulate agriculture, health, trade are suffocating under outdated licensing regimes, unpredictable taxation, and administrative interference. Adding a new regulator in such an ecosystem is akin to pouring clean water into a dirty pipe. The real reform lies in deregulating agricultural marketing, removing market-distorting subsidies, and empowering independent testing and certification systems, not in expanding bureaucratic presence.

Even reform-oriented initiatives like the Digital Pakistan Authority (DPA) and NDC are marred by overlapping mandates and institutional ambiguity. Both agencies claim leadership in digital governance, yet the Ministry of IT & Telecom already holds this portfolio. The consequence? Multiple command centers, contradictory policies, and fragmented implementation. As seen in previous attempts like the Digital Pakistan Vision (2018), creating more institutions without removing institutional friction leads to more confusion, not more reform.¹⁰

Similarly, the E-Procurement System, while commendable in intent, is being deployed across 279 agencies without sufficient investment in process reengineering, procurement transparency tools, or public audit mechanisms raising fears of digitizing inefficiencies rather than correcting them.¹¹

The problem, therefore, is not just bureaucratic overproduction but also, it’s the absence of policy coherence, accountability, and institutional rationalization. Pakistan now has multiple agencies dealing with privatization (Privatization Commission), cybercrime (NCCIA, NFCA), digital services (DPA, NDC), intelligence (NIFTAC, PIFTACs, NACTA), economic modernization (PRMI), and law enforcement targeting (NTC, Trade-Based Money Laundering Directorate) often without any crosswalk, results framework, or sunset clause. In public administration terms, this is not state-building, it’s state-bloating. As global public sector reform literature warns, excessive institutional layering without mandate clarity is a recipe for redundancy, not results.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s federal institutional strategy seems guided more by optics than outcomes, creating agencies that serve as symbols of action rather than instruments of delivery. Agencies like the Committee to Protect Employee Interests may have been formed to smooth the fallout from the merger of 82 departments, but it is unlikely to produce meaningful labor protection without a transparent and enforceable civil service framework. In a country where public trust in institutions is low¹², private investment is stagnant, and fiscal space is shrinking, governing through bureaucratic proliferation is both economically reckless and administratively regressive.

Table 1 New/Expanded Federal Government Agencies, FY 2024-25

#	Agency/Program Name	Parent Agency	Function(s)	Nature, Limitations	Overlapping
1	National Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre (NIFTAC)	National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)	Central hub for intelligence coordination and threat assessment across Pakistan.	Intelligence Coordination Centre. <i>coordination-only mandate; no independent enforcement.</i>	ISI, MI, IB, FIA, CTDs (prov), NACTA (duplication risk)
2	Provincial Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centers (PIFTACs)	NIFTAC	Provincial-level intelligence coordination for integrated national response.	Sub-national Intelligence Hubs. <i>unclear legal cover in 18th Amendment context.</i>	CTDs, Home Depts, IB field units, Special Branch (police), and PTA (for surveillance)
3	National Forensic and Cyber Crime Agency (NFCA)	Ministry of Interior	Conducts examination of forensic materials and assists in civil, criminal, corporate, and public matters.	Technical Forensic Authority. <i>lacks prosecution; supports investigation only.</i>	FIA NR3C (legacy), PFSA (Punjab), police labs, NACTA (forensics), NADRA (for ID forgery), MoST bodies
4	National Cyber Crimes Investigation Agency (NCCIA)	Ministry of Interior	Investigates and prosecutes cybercrimes at a national level, replacing FIA's Cybercrime Wing.	Federal Investigative Authority. <i>jurisdictional conflict with FIA still unresolved.</i>	FIA NR3C, PTA (content control), ISI Cyber Cell, MoITT CERTs, PSEB, and MOD/IB (cyber intelligence)
5	National Agri-trade and Food Safety Authority (NAFSA)	Ministry of National Food Security & Research	Ensures compliance with agri-trade standards and food safety regulations.	Regulatory Authority. <i>federal-provincial mandate blur.</i>	PSQCA, PARC, ANF (in case of banned agri-chemicals), provincial food authorities, and MNFSR's own pre-existing directorates
6	Cannabis Control and Regulatory Authority (CCRA)	Ministry of Narcotics Control	Regulates cultivation, production, and distribution of cannabis for medical and industrial use.	Specialized Regulatory Authority. <i>stigma, legal ambiguity under CNSA Act, provincial restrictions.</i>	ANF, DRAP (for medical cannabis), MoST (biotech), MoCC (industrial use), Mol (drug laws enforcement)
7	Pakistan Space Activities Regulatory Board (PSARB)	SUPARCO	Regulates commercial and research space activities in Pakistan.	Regulatory Board. <i>weak legal regime for private sector regulation.</i>	SUPARCO itself (execution vs regulation confusion), MoST, PTA (frequencies), PEMRA (if broadcasting involved), Civil Aviation (UAVs)
8	Pakistan Climate Change Authority	Ministry of Climate Change	Implements climate policies and oversees environmental sustainability measures.	Implementation & Oversight Authority. <i>weak enforcement power, coordination dependent on other ministries.</i>	EPA, NDMA (climate disaster response), Planning Commission (CDES), PDMA, SDGs Unit, Forest divisions

9	National Digital Commission (NDC)	Prime Minister's Office	Leads nationwide digital transformation strategy and policy coordination.	High-level Strategy Commission. <i>lacks executive force; implementation depends on DPA/MoITT.</i>	DPA, MoITT, NITB, EGD, PRAL (FBR), PTA (infrastructure)
10	Digital Pakistan Authority (DPA)	Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication	Facilitates digitization of government services and promotes tech adoption.	Executive Tech Authority. <i>unclear delineation with MoITT internal structures.</i>	NDC (strategy), EGD (execution), NITB, PITB (provincial), PRAL (tax digitization)
11	Pakistan Regulatory Modernization Initiative (PRMI)	Board of Investment	Streamlines regulatory approvals and business processes.	Reform Facilitation Program. <i>non-statutory, advisory role only.</i>	SMEDA, SECP, Provincial SBES, FBR's IRIS portal, Cabinet Division Reforms Unit, KPBOIT, PBIT
12	E-Procurement System	Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA)	Digitizes public procurement for transparency and efficiency.	Digital Governance System. <i>success depends on adoption across ministries; not enforceable by PPRA alone.</i>	AGPR, MoF (expenditure systems), ministries' ERP tools, and WB-funded e-procurement pilots
13	Privatization Commission (Expanded Initiatives)	Ministry of Privatisation	Facilitates divestment of state-owned enterprises.	Statutory Privatization Commission. <i>political economy resistance and SOE legal protections.</i>	SOEs Boards, Finance Division, Planning Commission (project approvals), CCP (competition concerns)
14	Directorate General of National Targeting Centre (NTC)	Federal Board of Revenue	Coordinates targeted intelligence operations and profiling systems.	Intelligence and Risk Directorate. <i>overlaps with data-holding bodies; legal constraints on profiling private data.</i>	FIA, ISI, IB, Customs Intelligence, NADRA (data sharing), FBR RTOs
15	Directorate General of Trade-Based Money Laundering	Federal Board of Revenue	Monitors and investigates illicit financial flows through trade.	Financial Investigation Directorate. <i>limited prosecution power; relies on FIA referrals.</i>	SBP-FMU, FIA AMLU, Customs Intelligence, SECP, MoFA (if trade via diplomatic routes)
16	Committee to Protect Employee Interests	Cabinet Division	Ensures job security and benefits during departmental mergers or reforms.	Inter-Ministerial Committee <i>ad hoc body; lacks binding enforcement authority.</i>	Establishment Division (service structure), Finance Division (salary continuity), Law Division (legal cover)

Government of the Punjab, FY 2024–25

The Government of Punjab's FY 2024–25 institutional expansion appears to be driven more by bureaucratic ambition than by evidence-based governance reform. At first glance, initiatives like the Punjab Public Financial Management Reforms Structure and the PGFS Implementation Unit sound promising echoing buzzwords like fiscal responsibility, green financing, and pension reform. But

underneath these reformist labels lie the same old approach: creating new administrative layers rather than streamlining or restructuring the old ones. The new Defined Contribution (DC) pension scheme, for example, is being pushed while the unsustainable Defined Benefit (DB) system remains largely unreformed, continuing to drain provincial finances. Without a serious fiscal audit or institutional consolidation, these “reforms” risk becoming cosmetic placeholders.¹³

Take the creation of the Punjab Affordable Housing Program (PAHP) and its multiple implementation units working with PHATA, the Urban Unit, and HUD&PHE. Rather than consolidating housing authorities into a lean, responsive body, the government has further fragmented responsibility and accountability. This raises a critical question: who owns delivery? In a province already plagued by overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic inertia, the PAHP might end up being more about managing consultants and donor reporting requirements than actually delivering affordable housing to citizens.^{14,15}

The expansion into digital governance through PRIDE, e-governance cells, and the AI-powered Central Media Monitoring Unit again reveals the state’s obsession with “techno-bureaucratic modernity.” But e-governance is not about digitizing dysfunction, it’s about reducing it. Punjab’s governance system is still heavily paper-based, discretion-driven, and plagued by data silos. Without deep civil service reform and genuine transparency, adding more dashboards, apps, and AI tools won’t fix entrenched institutional pathologies. One can say that the real blockage is not technology but it’s the absence of performance-linked accountability.¹⁶

Even the creation of Gujrat Division and Divisional Digital Media Wings follows a familiar playbook: divide, duplicate, and declare victory. While the rationale offered is better administrative efficiency, research globally suggests that decentralization without capacity-building only adds new rungs to an already overburdened hierarchy. These new divisions and communication wings may do little more than institutionalize patronage networks and provide additional budget lines for politically favored posts, common practices in Pakistan’s provincial expansion culture.^{17,18}

Punjab’s new institutes like the Nawaz Sharif Cancer and Cardiology Institutes and expanded Medical Teaching Institutions (MTIs) represent an expansion of public healthcare capacity. But unless these institutions are governed autonomously, insulated from political interference, and funded sustainably, they risk becoming high-cost white elephants. Pakistan’s experience with large public sector health projects, from PIMS to Mayo, is that building infrastructure is easy but maintaining quality and staffing in the long run is hard and costly.¹⁹

These expansions reflect a pattern of institutional mimicry without internal transformation. A study revealed a 440% increase in Public-Sector Companies from 2008 to 2018, many overlapping existing departments with weak accountability.²⁰ New units and agencies are created with ambitious mandates, but with little clarity on whether they replace, overlap with, or merely add to existing bureaucracies. More governance does not always mean better governance; especially in a province where administrative sprawl, political interference, and fiscal mismanagement continue to undermine public service delivery.²¹ The government must move beyond announcements and undertake a serious audit: What are these institutions delivering, and at what cost to the taxpayer and to private sector dynamism?

Table 2 New/Expanded Government of the Punjab Agencies, FY 2024-25

#	Agency/Program Name	Parent Agency	Function(s)	Nature, Limitations	Overlapping
1	Punjab Public Financial Management Reforms Structure	Finance Department, Government of Punjab	Implements pension and fiscal reforms through new administrative setups.	Full Government (Program Unit); <i>Multiple finance-related reform bodies already exist; line departments resist implementation; project-based staffing causing instability.</i>	PRMP, AGP, FD, CGA, ADP Cell, PIFRA
2	Punjab Green Financing Strategy (PGFS) Implementation Unit	Environment Department, Government of Punjab	Facilitates climate-resilient investment using green financing tools.	Autonomous Unit (Donor-linked); <i>No legal authority to approve or enforce financing; risk of donor-driven fragmentation.</i>	P&D Green Projects Wing, PPIF, Punjab Climate Authority (proposed), EPD Projects Wing, EE&C Unit
3	Punjab Affordable Housing Program (PAHP)	Housing, Urban Development & Public Health Engineering Department (HUD&PHE)	Supports low-income housing development through infrastructure investments and private sector involvement.	Full Government Program; <i>Land allocation overlaps, urban planning conflicts, dependency on private sector engagement yet regulatory gaps persist</i>	PHATA, LDA, Urban Unit, PHA, District Councils, Punjab Shelter Authority
4	Punjab Family Planning Program Management Unit	Population Welfare Department, Government of Punjab	Coordinates delivery of family planning services across the province.	Full Government (Vertical Program); <i>Dual delivery pathways via DoH and PWD cause fragmentation; data incompatibility and staff overlap persist.</i>	DoH, LHW Program (Primary Health), MNCH, PPHI, DHDCs
5	SMART Punjab (World Bank-backed)	Planning & Development Board, Government of Punjab	Drives market and governance reforms in public service delivery.	Donor-Driven Reform Program; <i>Turf conflicts with PITB on ownership of ICT; slow sectoral integration; short-term staff retention risk.</i>	PITB (e-governance), PRMP, ADU (Delivery Unit), SDG Cell, EGA, Digital Punjab Cell
6	Gujrat Division (New Administrative Division)	Government of Punjab	Enhances administrative efficiency and resource allocation in four districts: Gujrat, Hafizabad, Mandi Bahauddin, and Wazirabad.	Full Government (Administrative); <i>Budget redistribution from existing divisions; coordination issues with existing revenue and health jurisdictions; staff reshuffling risks.</i>	BOR (Land Mgmt), LG&CD, Finance (allocation formulas), Police Divisions
7	Punjab Life Insurance Company (PLIC)	Finance Department, Government of Punjab	Provides life insurance services to government employees and the general public.	Semi-Autonomous (State-owned Company); <i>Regulated by SECP but operationally governed by FD; poor synergy with AG Office for premium deductions.</i>	SLIC, Punjab Insurance Fund, Treasury Wing FD, SECP regulations
8	Specialized Health Institutions & MTIs	Specialized Healthcare & Medical Education Department	Introduces autonomous boards and governance for health facilities to improve service delivery.	Autonomous (Under MTI Law); <i>Legal ambiguity around HR rules; resistance from unions; quality regulation overlaps with PHC; fragmented referral mechanisms.</i>	DoH (primary), PMDC, PHC, P&SHD, UHS

9	Property Valuation Units & Digital Tax Services	Excise, Taxation & Narcotics Control Department	Standardizes property valuation and digitizes tax collection processes.	Government-Digital Hybrid; <i>Inter-agency data integration not finalized; valuation criteria inconsistent; resistance from revenue field staff.</i>	PLRA, LDA, BOR, PITB (backend), Local Govt Property Units
10	Digital Transformation Units (e-Gov) under PRIDE Project	Finance Department, Government of Punjab	Promotes e-governance at divisional and departmental levels to enhance efficiency and transparency.	Program Unit (WB-Backed); <i>Role confusion with PITB; sustainability of IT infrastructure post-project period unclear; capacity mismatch at local level.</i>	PITB, PRMP, Digital Punjab Unit, SDG Cell (P&D), SED-ISMS, SHC&ME HIS
11	AI-Powered Central Media Monitoring Unit	Directorate General Public Relations (DGPR), Punjab	Monitors media content using AI for strategic communication and countering misinformation.	Specialized Internal Unit; <i>Legally unclear data scraping rights; dependence on proprietary AI without indigenous capacity; risk of content manipulation claims.</i>	PITB, PMRU (CM's Office), MoIB (federal), ISPR (media monitoring)
12	Divisional Digital Media Wings	Directorate General Public Relations (DGPR), Punjab	Enhances public outreach and media engagement at the divisional level.	Subnational Extension Unit; <i>Role redundancy with divisional DC outreach; lacks trained communication officers; political narrative risk.</i>	LG&CD info desks, DC Offices, PITB (platform backend), DGPR existing outreach
13	Nawaz Sharif Institute of Cancer Treatment & Research, Lahore	Specialized Healthcare & Medical Education Department	Provides specialized oncology treatment and conducts research in cancer care.	Autonomous Health Institute.	Shaukat Khanum, UHS, PHC, Cancer Registry Project (P&D), PMRC
14	Nawaz Sharif Institute of Cardiology, Sargodha	Specialized Healthcare & Medical Education Department	Offers cardiovascular care and training through a state-of-the-art facility.	Autonomous Health Institute	PIC (Lahore), PHC, PMDC, UHS, MNHSRC (regulatory overlap)
15	Punjab School Reorganization Program	School Education Department, Government of Punjab	Rationalizes and restructures public schools for better resource utilization and improved educational outcomes.	Full Government Education Reform; <i>Teacher unions, overlapping enrolment targets, rural school accessibility gaps; DEOs resist consolidation.</i>	PMIU (EMIS), PEF, Punjab Literacy Dept, District Education Authorities

Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FY 2024–25

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's FY 2024–25 institutional expansion reflects the provincial government's eagerness to demonstrate reform through infrastructure and administrative growth. On the surface, the Rescue 1122 tehsil-level expansion and the establishment of new medical teaching institutions (MTIs) and allied hospitals appear to be responsive governance actions.²² However, the creation of 44 new rescue stations in one fiscal year, without parallel staffing, training, and equipment allocations, raises concerns about unfunded mandates; a problem well-documented in KPK's past service delivery audits.²³

The expansion of facilities without functional capacity leads to institutional hollowing, where buildings exist but services falter.

The launch of the Daraban Economic Zone Authority and the Trade Corridor Hub at Torkham may be seen as positive steps for regional economic integration. However, Pakistan’s economic zones have historically underperformed due to land acquisition bottlenecks, lack of infrastructure services, and overlapping jurisdictional claims between federal and provincial entities. Without correcting these foundational issues or establishing a single-window facilitation system, the creation of new SEZs risks replicating the failure of Rashakai and other underutilized zones.^{24,25,26}

In the social sector, KPK’s approach to institutional expansion seems to favor quantity over quality. The TEVTA vocational training centers and Ehsaas Rozgar-type employment schemes target unemployed youth, but there is little evaluation of their effectiveness or alignment with market needs. International experience and studies such as those by the World Bank’s Skills for Jobs series show that vocational programs must be demand-driven and industry-linked to yield long-term benefits. In KPK’s case, short-term political visibility has often overshadowed long-term sustainability and employability.^{27,28}

The proliferation of “modern” governance units such as the KP IT Board digital service expansion, the Solar Scheme Implementation Unit, and the Assets Management Unit under Auqaf while well-intentioned, reflect a technocratic belief that new institutions can solve governance failure caused by old institutions. However, KPK’s fiscal room is shrinking, and many of these agencies will require recurring funding, HR support, and institutional autonomy to deliver results. The Debt Management Fund, though a timely concept, might end up being symbolic unless embedded within a broader public financial management reform.²⁹ Similarly, M&E cells under the Local Government Department often exist in name only, generating reports that feed filing cabinets rather than informing decisions.³⁰

Table 3 New/Expanded Government of KPK Agencies, FY 2024-25

#	Agency/Program Name	Parent Agency	Function(s)	Nature, <i>Limitations</i>	Overlapping
1	Expanded Rescue 1122 Tehsil-Level Network	Rescue 1122 / Home Department	Improves emergency response by establishing 44 new rescue stations across various tehsils.	Full Government Agency; Resource duplication; HR strain; no trauma center coordination.	DHQ/THQ (DoH), TMAs (ambulance), DCs, Emergency Units (Health), PRCS
2	Daraban Economic Zone Authority	KP Economic Zones Development and Management Company (KPEZDMC)	Regulates and promotes industrial and commercial activity in Daraban Special Economic Zone (DI Khan Division).	Semi-Autonomous Development Authority; <i>Conflicting jurisdiction with land regulators; unclear fiscal incentives regime.</i>	BoR (land), KP-SEZA, KPRA (tax), Industries Dept, BOI, SMEDA, PEDO
3	KP IT Board / Digital Service Units (Expanded)	Science & Technology and IT Department	Strengthens digital governance, innovation, and service delivery through expanded DSUs.	Statutory Authority; <i>Sectoral pushback; digital duplication; HR retention issues.</i>	PITB (tech models), Local Govt MIS Units, PMRU, KPRA e-filing, Planning & Dev (M&E), NADRA (ID-linked services)
4	TEVTA Vocational Skills Program – New Centers	Technical Education and Vocational	Expands technical and vocational training centers in underserved districts.	Statutory Authority; <i>Fragmented certification system; overlaps in curriculum and trade targeting.</i>	NAVTTTC, SMEDA, KPBOIT, KPITB, Skill Development Fund (WB), Labor Dept

Training Authority (TEVTA) KP					
5	New MTIs, Allied Hospitals & Medical Colleges	Health Department / SH&ME	Expands healthcare delivery and medical education across KP, including DI Khan and Kohat.	Autonomous Statutory Bodies (MTI Act); <i>Staff sharing confusion; bifurcated HR rules; referral gaps; rivalry between MTI & DGHS units.</i>	KMU, PMDC, DGHS, DHQ/THQ hospitals, PHC, UHS
6	Urban Mobility Regulatory Units (BRT Expansion)	Transport & Mass Transit Department	Oversees BRT expansion, transit systems regulation, and urban mobility policies in Peshawar and surrounding cities.	Regulatory Entity (Notified Unit); <i>Overlapping jurisdictions with PDA & LG; data integration with KPUMA lacking.</i>	TransPeshawar, KPUMA, PDA (roads), LG Dept, LGERDD, Police (traffic), KPRA (ticketing taxes)
7	KP Islamic Takaful Insurance Company	Health Department / Sehat Card Plus	Provides Shariah-compliant health insurance services; integrated with the Sehat Card Plus program.	Competitive Government Enterprise; <i>Blurring between public subsidy and private competition; weak regulation clarity.</i>	SECP, SLIC, SCP (Insurer), AG Office
8	Assets Management Unit – Auqaf Department	Auqaf, Hajj, Religious & Minority Affairs Dept	Digitally maps and manages Auqaf properties using GIS-based tools.	Technical Unit under Department; <i>Land record conflicts; no uniform revenue structure; GIS integration with BoR unclear.</i>	BoR, LCB, Waqf Boards, PLRA (federal template), TMAs
9	Quran Mahal, Peshawar	Archives & Libraries / Religious Affairs Dept	A cultural and religious center for preserving ancient Quranic manuscripts and promoting Quranic heritage.	Government Cultural Facility; <i>Not integrated with higher education, lack of standardized preservation.</i>	Dept of Culture, Auqaf, Directorate of Libraries, (religious affairs), Education Archives
10	KP Solar Scheme Implementation Unit	Energy & Power Department	Implements the solar panel distribution scheme to benefit 130,000 households in high-temperature regions like D.I. Khan and Tank.	Project Unit (Donor-Govt Hybrid); <i>No maintenance system; overlaps in beneficiary selection.</i>	PEDO, AEDB, Local Govt (home lists), WASA (pump loads), Planning & Dev (targeting), Energy Ministry
11	Ehsaas Rozgar, Nojawan Rozgar & Hunar Programs	Social Welfare, Youth & Labor Departments	Provide interest-free loans, skills training, and self-employment support for youth and marginalized communities.	Inter-departmental Program; <i>Multiple loan schemes, eligibility confusion, overlap with existing programs and registries.</i>	Ehsaas (Fed), NAVTTC, KPRA (tax waivers), BISP (targeting), SMEDA, TEVTA
12	Trade Corridor Hub – Torkham	Industries & Commerce Department	Facilitates trade with Afghanistan via logistics and warehousing infrastructure near the Torkham border crossing.	Development Infrastructure Hub; <i>Border clearance overlaps with federal bodies; security and customs clearance not in KP control.</i>	FBR, NLC, MoC, Customs, Border Force, MoFA, Police, CPEC Cell, Bol
13	Debt Management Fund (KP)	Finance Department	Creates a provincial fund for managing debt, improving fiscal	Internal Fiscal Strategy Unit; <i>Lack enforcement tools; federal debt policy</i>	MoF, AG Office, PRMP, Debt Strategy

			discipline and repayment strategy.	<i>overrides; not fully linked with line department liabilities.</i>	Cell (Donor), KPRA (revenue), Treasury
14	Project Management Unit – Water & Sanitation	Local Government, Elections & Rural Development Department (LGE&RDD)	Strengthens oversight of rural and peri-urban WASH projects under various donor-funded initiatives.	Donor-Funded Project Unit; <i>Fragmented implementation; service duplication; local bodies not fully engaged.</i>	PHE, WASA, UNICEF WASH, SNG, KP Urban Unit, LGIs, Municipal Committees
15	M&E Cells – Local Government Department	Local Government, Elections & Rural Development Department	Monitors project implementation in urban and rural municipal bodies for greater accountability and efficiency.	Internal Monitoring Cells; <i>Output-focused rather than outcome-driven; lack of real-time data; not aligned with LG digital platforms.</i>	PMRU, KPRA, P&DD M&E Cell, Donor Project MIS Units, KP-EIP

Government of Baluchistan, FY 2024–25

Baluchistan's FY 2024–25 institutional developments, while framed as steps toward administrative modernization and investment facilitation, illustrate a deeper and more chronic problem: state-driven institutional mimicry without foundational state capacity. The establishment of the Baluchistan Public Private Partnership (PPP) Authority and its accompanying Viability Gap Fund (VGF) Unit mirror federal and Punjab models of PPP development, yet Baluchistan lacks the bureaucratic and private sector ecosystem necessary to implement complex infrastructure partnerships.³¹ Despite years of development rhetoric, the province continues to struggle with absorptive capacity, weak legal enforcement, and investor mistrust are realities that money and new authorities alone cannot fix.³²

The PPP Authority's success depends on its ability to crowd in private investment and ensure transparent risk-sharing frameworks. However, as experience in Sindh and KP has shown, PPP projects are highly vulnerable to elite capture and rent-seeking when oversight mechanisms are weak. In Baluchistan's case, where bureaucratic discretion and political patronage remain dominant, the risk is that the PPP Authority becomes a shell institution: established to tick reform boxes and secure donor visibility, but incapable of delivering financially viable project.³³ Furthermore, a viability gap fund, while theoretically justifiable, can quickly become a fiscal liability if not governed by strict project appraisal frameworks and independent auditing both of which are rare in Baluchistan's project governance culture.³⁴

The establishment of funds like the Provincial Government Employees Group Insurance Fund and the LIEDA Employees Pension Support Fund may respond to long-standing employee welfare demands. Yet in practice, such schemes are often used to placate unions and absorb post-retirement fiscal pressure without addressing the root causes of public sector bloat. Baluchistan's payroll already consumes over 65% of its current budget allocating additional funds for insurance and pensions without comprehensive civil service reform may only deepen the fiscal hole.³⁵ Moreover, opaque actuarial assumptions, lack of contribution matching, and absence of performance metrics render such welfare funds unsustainable in the long term. What the province needs is not more passive entitlement structures, but a rationalized, merit-based, and productivity-linked public service framework.³⁶

The education and governance-related institutions such as the Endowment Fund for Shaheed Ayub Buledi Higher Secondary School, the M&E Cell in the P&D Department, and the Project Management Unit for Drinking Water Hubs fit a broader pattern in Baluchistan's administrative design: creating units

for optics rather than outcomes. Education in the province suffers not from funding alone but from ghost schools, absent teachers, and parallel politicized education boards.³⁷ Similarly, water projects have historically been riddled with contractor collusion, poor community participation, and lack of sustainability post-construction. Establishing PMUs and endowment funds is therefore not wrong in itself but without rigorous, independent monitoring, these institutions are likely to become fiscal artifacts rather than service delivery catalysts.³⁸

At the heart of these developments lies a critical paradox: Baluchistan's governance reforms often replicate models from stronger provinces or international templates without adapting them to local political-economy realities, resulting in symbolic institutions, visible on paper and in budgets, but ineffective in practice.^{39,40} A study points out that development packages (e.g., Aghaz-e-Haqooq, South Balochistan Package) followed a formulaic approach that ignored local voices and capacities, facilitating elite capture instead of meaningful institutional strengthening.⁴¹ Without contextual grounding, institutional transplantation fails, producing agencies that lack functional legitimacy. What the province needs instead is a fundamental rethink of its governance architecture, emphasizing *functional consolidation*, *fiscal accountability*, and *citizen-centric service delivery*, rather than the continuous creation of siloed, donor-pleasing agencies.^{42,43}

Table 4 New/Expanded Government of Baluchistan Agencies, FY 2024-25

#	Agency/Program Name	Parent Agency	Function(s)	Nature, Limitations	Overlapping
1	Baluchistan Public Private Partnership (PPP) Authority	Planning & Development Department (P&D)	Manages and promotes PPP-based infrastructure investments across sectors.	Statutory Authority (PPP Act 2021); <i>regulates but does not execute projects; limited to PPP domain.</i>	P&D, BPPRA, Finance Dept, PMUs (execution overlap), M&E Cell (reporting conflicts)
2	Baluchistan PPP Unit – Viability Gap Fund	PPP Authority / Finance Department	Provides financial gap support to make PPP projects viable for private investors.	Financial Unit; <i>fund management only; cannot initiate or evaluate projects; limited to viability financing role.</i>	Finance Dept, PPP Authority, PCGCL (if energy), Planning Cell (P&D)
3	Provincial Government Employees Group Insurance Fund	Services & General Administration Dept (S&GAD)	Ensures group life insurance and welfare benefits for provincial civil servants.	Welfare Fund Unit; <i>covers in-service and deceased employees only; no overlap with retirement pensions or EOBI.</i>	S&GAD Pensions, Benevolent Fund, EOBI, Finance Dept (Pension Wing)
4	LIEDA Employees Pension Support Fund	Lasbela Industrial Estates Development Authority (LIEDA)	Supports pension liabilities for retired staff of Lasbela Industrial Estate.	Pension Fund (Statutory Body Specific); <i>limited to LIEDA's own ex-employees; no cross-sector use or policy leverage.</i>	S&GAD Pension Cell, GPF, Finance Dept, Industry Dept (if absorbed projects)
5	Endowment Fund for Shaheed Ayub Buledi Higher Secondary School	School Education Department	Provides sustained funding for quality education access and school development.	Dedicated Endowment Fund; <i>locked to one school (non-transferrable); cannot be scaled or merged with broader education.</i>	SED Infra Wing, School Endowments, Donor Project Funds

6	Monitoring & Evaluation Cell – P&D Department	Planning & Development Department	Conducts internal M&E for tracking Annual Development Plan (ADP) implementation and ensuring governance.	Internal Oversight Unit; <i>monitors ADP schemes only; no powers for audit/enforcement; overlaps with evaluator functions.</i>	AG Office, Audit Dept, Third-party Evaluators, CMIT, PPMU, Line Dept MIS Units
7	Project Management Unit – Drinking Water Hub Projects	Public Health Engineering Department / P&D Dept	Ensures oversight and delivery of rural drinking water and sanitation infrastructure in key districts.	Project-Specific Execution Unit; <i>geographically limited; not permanent; donor-sensitive implementation timelines.</i>	PHE, Irrigation Dept, LG Dept, WSSCs, PPP Authority, PHED Planning Cell

Government of Sindh, FY 2024–25

Sindh’s FY 2024–25 institutional expansion illustrates a familiar governance playbook: respond to persistent delivery failures by adding new administrative structures instead of reforming existing ones. Projects such as the Inclusive Enclave in Korangi, signal noble intent to serve marginalized communities. However, experience with large-scale social integration projects in Sindh (e.g., Benazir Bhutto Shaheed Housing Project) shows that such initiatives often suffer from elite capture, land use disputes, and weak monitoring. Without clarity on delivery mechanisms, transparency safeguards, and inter-departmental ownership, such enclaves risk becoming expensive, underutilized symbols of developmental tokenism rather than sustainable welfare models.^{44,45}

The Shared Services Unit (SSU) and the PMIU for Rural Growth Centers reflect an increasing shift in Sindh toward creating "program management units" parallel to the bureaucracy. While the stated objective of centralizing services (SSU) or coordinating rural uplift (PMIU) sounds modern, these units often operate outside core departmental HR and accountability structures, funded via ADP but staffed by contract consultants.⁴⁶ This model has been critiqued as fostering “dual bureaucracies” where project units operate with donor-facing visibility but do not strengthen long-term state capacity or institutional learning.⁴⁷ The Rural Growth Centers PMIU, for instance, will only succeed if integrated with district governments, but Sindh’s local government system remains functionally marginalized, with limited fiscal devolution.⁴⁸

The IT Data Center Strengthening Unit under the Planning & Development Department is emblematic of the Sindh government’s fascination with digital infrastructure, often pursued in isolation from broader civil service reform. The scheme remains unapproved, perhaps indicating fiscal hesitation or planning incoherence. But beyond budgetary issues, there’s a deeper concern: data systems and e-governance tools cannot substitute for human capacity, policy integration, or inter-agency coordination. As noted in IT governance literature, without full interoperability, secure data protocols, and a culture of data use in policymaking, such IT investments often fall into disuse or become redundant silos.⁴⁹

The Monitoring, Evaluation & Coordination Unit (PHED) and the Disaster Management and E-Governance Cell in Malir are attempts to institutionalize oversight and crisis response. Yet, Sindh’s history with M&E is checkered. Reports from ICG and independent evaluations of the Sindh Education Reform Program show that M&E units are rarely empowered or heeded. They tend to produce compliance documents rather than actionable intelligence. Moreover, the creation of an e-governance and election cell at the DC level, especially in Malir i.e. a politically sensitive and urbanizing district raises questions

about politicization of administrative reforms. Will these cells truly manage disasters and digital services, or will they become tools of electoral engineering and rent distribution?

These institutions are introduced in the language of coordination, digitization, and decentralization, but in practice, they layer complexity onto a governance system already plagued by fragmentation, political interference, and low bureaucratic morale. So, what Sindh, and Pakistan more broadly, needs is not more bureaucratic innovation in name, but radical simplification, consolidation of functions, and a governance culture that prioritizes performance over proliferation.⁵⁰

Table 5 New/Expanded Government of Sindh Agencies, FY 2024-25

#	Agency/Program Name	Parent Agency	Function(s)	Nature, <i>Limitations</i>	Overlapping
1	Inclusive Enclave, Korangi	Planning & Development Department (P&DD)	Offers integrated services, education, rehabilitation, training, accommodation, clinical services, and recreation for marginalized communities.	Integrated Social Facility (non-statutory); <i>location-locked (Korangi); no province-wide mandate or funding autonomy; cannot duplicate department mandates.</i>	SWD, SED, DoH, LGD, DC Korangi, PWD
2	Shared Services Unit (SSU)	Planning & Development Department (P&DD)	Centralizes administrative services to provide cross-functional support to foreign funding agencies and implementing departments.	Support Unit (administrative); <i>serves donor-linked project processing only; cannot directly implement, procure, or fund; created by notification (2020).</i>	PCMU, Finance IMU, PPP Unit, ITD, LGD
3	Project Management & Implementation Unit (PMIU) for Rural Growth Centers	Planning & Development Department (P&DD)	Manages the rollout of rural development hubs under the Poverty Reduction Strategy in districts like Thatta, Badin, Tharparkar, and Larkana.	Time-bound PMU; <i>project-linked under Poverty Reduction Strategy; lacks implementation autonomy; geographic lock (Thatta, Badin, etc.).</i>	LGD, RSPNs, PCMU, SSU, BoR, SED Rural Wing
4	IT Data Center Strengthening Unit – P&DD	Planning & Development Department (P&DD)	Enhances digital infrastructure by strengthening servers, data storage, software, and hardware for the Data Center in P&DD.	Technical Unit; <i>exclusive to P&DD systems; no broader cross-departmental jurisdiction or IT policy control.</i>	ITD, IMU (Finance), E-Gov Unit (Admin), SSU, CMIS
5	Monitoring, Evaluation & Coordination Unit – PHED	Public Health Engineering Department (PHED)	Conducts monitoring and evaluation for rural water supply and drainage projects, aligning with Sustainable Development Goal #6.	Departmental M&E Unit; <i>confined to PHED-led rural schemes; lacks audit or enforcement powers; overlaps in data and indicators.</i>	P&DD M&E, Audit, LGD, PCMU, PDMA, SBICA
6	Disaster Management, E-Governance, and Election Cell Unit – Malir	Deputy Commissioner's Office, Malir District	Integrated unit for disaster response, e-governance, and election-related activities, established through the construction of a multipurpose annex.	District Cell; <i>tied to DC Malir; no statutory authority; overlap-prone; non-scalable structure beyond district.</i>	PDMA, ECP, Home Dept, ITD, LGD, DC Coordination Unit

Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, FY 2024–25

Gilgit-Baltistan's FY 2024–25 agency expansion reflects an ambitious push to modernize governance through new institutions in IT, technical education, tourism, minerals, and energy. While the vision aligns with national trends, it raises a core concern: can new agencies deliver without the capacity, infrastructure, and local readiness to support them?

The new Information Technology Department may seem forward-looking, but without stable internet, trained personnel, and digitization across the public sector, IT reform is unlikely to succeed. Institutional gaps like missing legal frameworks, poor coordination, and weak political support limit real impact. An agency alone cannot fix these problems.

The Technical Education Department, shows a commitment to skill development. But vocational training needs strong links with local industries, job tracking, and coordination with employers. In GB, where formal job absorption is low, there's a real risk of producing unemployable graduates and repeating mistakes made in other provinces.⁵¹

The new Tourism and Culture Department is well-intentioned given GB's natural beauty, but adds to already overlapping tourism efforts by federal and provincial bodies. What's missing isn't another agency, but investment in infrastructure, safety protocols, and local management. Festivals and shows won't help if roads are unsafe, regulations are ignored, and local communities aren't involved.⁵²

The Directorate of Minerals and Renewable Energy PMU aim to formalize resource governance. But this requires more than surveys and licenses, it needs enforceable mining laws, strong land governance, and community benefit frameworks. Without these, mineral expansion may empower private contractors, not local people. Similarly, hydropower projects must be demand-driven and community-owned, or risk collapse after rollout.⁵³

The Community Investment Fund Management Unit is designed to promote decentralized development. Yet such funds across Pakistan often suffer from elite capture, poor targeting, and weak oversight, problems made worse in remote regions like GB. For this fund to succeed, it must ensure transparency, inclusion, and third-party evaluations.⁵⁴

Gilgit-Baltistan's new agencies reflect a commendable vision, but as public administration literature consistently reminds us: new institutions cannot succeed in old institutional cultures. Without complementary reforms in law, accountability, service delivery, and citizen engagement, these departments may struggle to deliver beyond project reports and annual budget speeches. Studies show that GB's historic lack of democratic mechanisms and community participation has entrenched top-down governance approaches, limiting the ability of new institutions to truly serve local needs.⁵⁵ For a region like GB, which sits at the intersection of opportunity and fragility, function must precede form and performance must matter more than expansion.

Table 6 New/Expanded Government of GB Agencies, FY 2024-25

#	Agency/Program Name	Parent Agency	Brief	Nature, Limitations	Overlapping
1	Information Technology Department	Government of Gilgit-Baltistan	Develops IT education and establishes an IT Board to enhance digital infrastructure and services.	Full Department; <i>GB-wide jurisdiction; no federal authority over telecom/data regulation. Can't control SCO or spectrum use.</i>	SCO, NITB, Edu Dept IT Cell, P&D Digital Wing, Admin Dept E-Gov Unit
2	Technical Education Department	Government of Gilgit-Baltistan	Promotes technical and vocational training programs to improve workforce skills.	Statutory Department; <i>GB-wide TVET oversight (post-TVET Act 2018); implementation via DTESD; lacks licensing/regulation authority.</i>	DTESD, NAVTTC, P&D Skill Cell, Finance Dept Training Fund, Labor Dept
3	Tourism and Culture Department	Government of Gilgit-Baltistan	Organizes events to boost tourism and preserve cultural heritage.	Provincial Department; <i>event authority and heritage custodian; no hotel licensing, tour regulation (done by LG or private).</i>	PTDC, LG Dept, Forest & Wildlife Dept, PWD Tourism Wing, Culture Directorate, Sports & Youth Affairs
4	Directorate of Minerals (Expanded)	Government of Gilgit-Baltistan	Regulates mining licenses and conducts geological surveys as part of institutional revamp.	Directorate-level Entity; <i>scope expanded post-2018 Reforms; jurisdiction limited to provincial lands; no say in federal mineral royalties.</i>	P&D Infra Section, Finance (Revenue), GB EPA, National Mineral Commission, Land Revenue Dept (BoR)
5	Project Management Unit – Renewable Energy	Government of Gilgit-Baltistan	Oversees renewable energy and micro-hydel power projects to promote sustainable energy solutions.	Project-Based Unit; <i>donor-linked (e.g., GLOF II, ADB); implementation-only; cannot regulate tariffs, grid operations, or licensing.</i>	Water & Power Dept, P&D Energy Wing, Finance Dept, NEPRA, LG Dept (rural energy)
6	Community Investment Fund Management Unit	Government of Gilgit-Baltistan	Supports localized economic initiatives under poverty reduction programs to empower communities.	Financial Unit under P&D; <i>non-lending, non-banking; limited to target communities (CIF pilots); no scaling beyond project scope.</i>	P&D, Finance Dept, LG Dept, Social Welfare Dept, CISP, RSPN GB

CONCLUSIONARY REMARKS

All in all, what we're seeing in Pakistan's governance model is more of the same: creating new institutions instead of reforming the old ones. While some of these new agencies may serve important roles if managed well, most are being added without asking basic questions: Are they really needed? Do they replace or just duplicate existing ones? Will they actually solve the problems they're meant to fix? Without clear answers and a proper review of what already exists, this trend of multiplying government bodies risks becoming a burden rather than a solution.

What Pakistan needs right now isn't just more government departments, it needs better ones. Real reform means cutting through the clutter, improving coordination, and holding institutions accountable for results. The focus should be on simplifying governance, not making it more complicated. Until that happens, simply expanding the state will not bring the meaningful change that citizens are hoping for.

As a starting point, governments must: (i) conduct functional audits of existing institutions to assess performance, overlaps, and relevance, ideally through performance matrices and third-party evaluations, before allocating resources to new ones. (ii) Where mandates are redundant or fragmented, agencies should be clustered under unified authorities through executive actions, improving coherence and reducing administrative silos. (iii) Budgetary allocations must shift from input-based funding to performance-based budgeting, linking disbursements to clearly defined service delivery targets and measurable outcomes. (iv) institutional design must be grounded in real needs by engaging local stakeholders, including communities, civil society, and sectoral experts, through structured consultations, participatory assessments, and feedback mechanisms.

In short: reform what's broken, repurpose what's idle, and resist the urge to multiply for the sake of visibility.

List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank	MTI Act	Medical Teaching Institutions Act
ADP	Annual Development Plan	NADRA	National Database & Registration Authority
AG Office / AGPR	Accountant General's Office / Accounts General Pakistan Revenues	NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
AEDB	Alternative Energy Development Board	NAFSA	National Agri-trade and Food Safety Authority
AGP	Auditor General of Pakistan	NAVTTTC	National Vocational & Technical Training Commission
ANF	Anti-Narcotics Force	NCCIA	National Cyber Crimes Investigation Agency
Auqaf Dept	Department of Religious Affairs & Auqaf	NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
BISP	Benazir Income Support Programme	NDC	National Digital Commission
Bol / BOI	Board of Investment	NEPRA	National Electric Power Regulatory Authority
BoR	Board of Revenue	NFCA	National Forensic and Cyber Crime Agency
BPPRA	Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority	NIFTAC	National Intelligence Fusion & Threat Assessment Centre
CCP	Competition Commission of Pakistan	NITB	National IT Board
CGA	Controller General of Accounts	NTC	National Targeting Centre
CISP	Community Initiatives Support Programme	PAHP	Punjab Affordable Housing Program
CNSA	Control of Narcotic Substances Act	PARC	Pakistan Agricultural Research Council
CMIS	Central Management Information System	PBM	Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal
CMIT	Chief Minister's Inspection Team	PCGCL	Provincial Coal & Gas Company Limited
DC	Deputy Commissioner	PCMU	Provincial Coordination & Monitoring Unit
DHDC	District Health & Development Committees	P&D / P&DD	Planning & Development Department
DHQ / THQ	District / Tehsil Headquarter Hospital	PEF	Punjab Education Foundation
DoH	Department of Health	PEDO	Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organization
DRAP	Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan	PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
DTESD	Directorate of Technical Education & Skills Development	PFSA	Punjab Forensic Science Agency
EGD	E-Government Directorate	PHA	Parks & Horticulture Authority
EGA	Economic Governance Accelerator	PHC	Punjab Healthcare Commission
E-Gov Unit	E-Governance Unit (usually under Admin/Home Departments)	PHED	Public Health Engineering Department
EOBI	Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution	PHF	Punjab Housing Foundation
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency	PIC	Punjab Institute of Cardiology
EPD	Environment Protection Department	PID	Press Information Department
FBR	Federal Board of Revenue	PIEDMC	Punjab Industrial Estates Development and Management Company
FD	Finance Department	PIFRA	Project to Improve Financial Reporting & Auditing
FIA	Federal Investigation Agency	PITB	Punjab Information Technology Board
GB	Gilgit-Baltistan	P&SHD	Primary & Secondary Healthcare Department
GB EPA	Gilgit-Baltistan Environmental Protection Agency	PIFTAC	Provincial Intelligence Fusion and Threat Assessment Centre

GLOF	Glacial Lake Outburst Flood	PITB	Punjab Information Technology Board
GPF	General Provident Fund	PLIC	Punjab Life Insurance Company
HUD&PHE	Housing, Urban Development & Public Health Engineering Dept	PLRA	Punjab Land Records Authority
IB	Intelligence Bureau	PMDC	Pakistan Medical & Dental Council
IMU	Implementation/Information Management Unit	PMIU	Project Management & Implementation Unit
IRIS	Integrated Revenue Information System (FBR)	PMRU	Performance Management & Reforms Unit
ISMS	Integrated School Management System	PRAL	Pakistan Revenue Automation Limited
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence	PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
ITD	Information Technology Department	PRIDE	Punjab Resource Improvement & Digital Effectiveness
KMC / KMU	Khyber Medical College / University	PRMP	Punjab Resource Management Program
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	PRMI	Pakistan Regulatory Modernization Initiative
KPBOIT	KP Board of Investment and Trade	PSQCA	Pakistan Standards & Quality Control Authority
KPEZDMC	KP Economic Zones Development & Management Company	PTA	Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
KPITB	KP Information Technology Board	PTDC	Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation
KPRA	KP Revenue Authority	PWD	Public Works Department
LDA	Lahore Development Authority	RSPN	Rural Support Programmes Network
LCB	Local Council Board	SBCA	Sindh Building Control Authority
LG / LGD	Local Government Department	SCO	Special Communications Organization
LGIs	Local Government Institutions	SCP	State-Controlled Program / Sehat Card Plus (KP)
LHW	Lady Health Worker (Program)	SECP	Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan
LIEDA	Lasbela Industrial Estates Development Authority	SED	School Education Department
MDMC	Medical & Dental College	SHC&ME	Specialized Healthcare & Medical Education Dept
MI	Military Intelligence	SLIC	State Life Insurance Corporation
MIS	Management Information System	SMEDA	Small & Medium Enterprises Development Authority
MNCH	Maternal, Neonatal & Child Health Program	SSU	Shared Services Unit
MNFSR	Ministry of National Food Security & Research	SWD	Social Welfare Department
MoC	Ministry of Commerce	TEVTA	Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority
MoCC	Ministry of Climate Change	TMA	Tehsil Municipal Administrations
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	TVET	Technical & Vocational Education & Training
MoF	Ministry of Finance	UHS	University of Health Sciences
Mol	Ministry of Interior	WASA	Water & Sanitation Agency
MoIB	Ministry of Information & Broadcasting	WB	World Bank
MoITT	Ministry of Information Technology & Telecom	WSSC	Water & Sanitation Services Company
MoST	Ministry of Science & Technology		
MTI	Medical Teaching Institution		

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